What Is Citizenship?
- an introduction to the concept and alternative models of citizenship

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INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1980s citizenship has become a key concept in the discourse on social science, education, and “top politics”. This revived interest in the concept is striking because for several decades after a period immediately after the Second World War where the meaning of the concept was widely discussed, it was more or less forgotten or ignored as a field of research and public deliberation. The concept of “active citizenship” has been implemented during the 1990s in the UK, Australia and Canada as cross-curricular themes in the political education of the primary school. In many other educational fields, for instance in lifelong-learning, the concept has gained a central position.

The popularity and wide-spread use of the concept might lead to the conclusion that it is well-defined and easily understood. However, just beneath the apparent consensus that it is a progressive and necessary aim of education to foster “active citizens”, profound disagreement and conflicts are to be found. Because, when the issue is to give a more explicit and accurate description of the aims of citizenship education, the clarification of the concept is involved in the past, present and future political struggles: What it means to be a citizen or not within a community, this is the normative aim of citizenship education and so forth.

From the perspective of social sciences, citizenship can be interpreted as both a political and a sociological concept. From both angles, the idea of citizenship is what it means for individuals and groups to belong to or be a member of a political and/or a socio-cultural community. Individuals and groups belonging to a community are connected to two, often interrelated dimensions. In the first place this deals with the formal status of the citizens, constituted by the legal framework of citizenship rights and duties. According to this dimension individuals and groups are bound together by the institutionalisation of rights and duties on different political levels. Secondly, citizenship is closely linked to the creation and reproduction of the political and socio-cultural identities of the community members.

In a democratic context the maintenance of both dimensions, formal rights/duties and identity, is of crucial importance and, compared with the politics of living within despotic or authoritarian communities, also of a special kind. Charles Taylor, the Canadian political philosopher, formulates this perspective in describing what the key element of a democratic society is,

"The nature of this kind of society (…) is that it requires a certain degree of commitment on the part of its citizens. Traditional despotism could ask of people only that they remain passive and obey the laws. A democracy, ancient or modern, has to ask more. It requires that its members be motivated to make the necessary contributions: of treasure (in taxes), sometimes in blood (in war); and it expects always some degree of participation in the
process of governance. A free society has to substitute for despotic enforcement with a certain degree of self-enforcement. Where this fails the system is in danger” (Taylor, 1997: 39).

However, an active citizenship cannot be practised in a political or cultural vacuum, whether thought within the perspective of the legal status of rights and duties or within the perspective of policies concerning community identity and the feeling of belonging to this community. If the intention of active citizenship is to involve the struggle for community coherence and identity, it is of outmost importance that the subjects of a certain democratic community feel loyal towards and reproduce a sense of belonging to this community, of course in a more or less intensive way. If this is not ensured, for instance through education for active citizenship, the link between democracy and citizenship is being questioned, too.

There are many reasons why citizenship has been revitalised since the end of the 1980s, below I intend to elaborate on several of them. However, a crucial reason concerns the problem of deciding in which community the two dimensions of an active democratic citizenship can be located and practised. In other words, which community forms the basis for rights/duties and identity/loyalty at the present time in European history?

Since the end of the 1980s Europe has met with two tremendous challenges. The breakdown of the Soviet Union and Communism in the Eastern and Central Europe states has resulted in the disintegration of the dominant bipolar Cold War political space of Europe. On the other hand, the political development within the EU has meant an intensification and expanding of European integration. In both cases new and old national and ethnic communities and identities have been mobilised, on local, sub-nation-state, and regional levels, in the search for political power and cultural autonomy. The more or less violent ethno-national reconfiguration of the political space of former Communist regimes (e.g. former Yugoslavia, Hungary, The Czech Republic) and within some Western European nation-states, expanding regional autonomy and self-determination (Scotland and Catalonia), has resulted in the fact that national and ethnic politics has gained new importance. At the same time several of these communities are already, or are on their way to be integrated in the EU.

It is a paradox that we notice a resurgence of ethnic and national policies of identity and feeling of belonging concurrently with the fact that European processes of integration may become a main vehicle in undermining the power of national and ethnic politics. Cultural globalisation and global processes of migration and decolonization since the Second World War could be added to these simultaneous and partly contradictory tendencies. These developments have led to the establishment of ethnic enclaves and minority cultures within the boundaries of the European nation-states. The old “naturalised” affinity between citizenship and national culture, and between the making of a nation-state and homogenous, unified national cultures is eroding.

Thus Europe is becoming a multicultural political space in a way unseen in the history of the modern European notion of citizenship. This may be opposed by the fact that Europe has always consisted of many national, ethnic, and religious communities. But unlike former periods of European history, the impact of an expanding economic and cultural globalisation is so immense, that it has become still harder for both majority and minority
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cultures to maintain their political, social, and geographical boundaries and undisputed cultural hegemony. And not least, thanks to the “universalisation” or world-wide spread of modern notions of democratic citizenship and human rights, the political climate within Europe has changed radically since the end of the Second World War in the aftermath of the collapse of the Western and Soviet empires. Minority cultures, whether territorially concentrated, as in many places in Eastern Europe, or in the form of ethnic enclaves, do not accept political and cultural inferiority, and claim to be recognised as equal members of society.

In other words, the European population are facing a historically unique political and multicultural situation, in which the two dimensions of citizenship are being expressed and struggled for on local, national, regional, and supra-national levels. This situation has reinforced the fact that citizenship is an “essentially contested concept”. Therefore, my theoretical approach to the concept is anchored in two interrelated premises. In the first place, citizenship is considered to be an ambiguous and contested cluster concept, viz. that the meaning and uses of the concept are connected to a changing repertoire of complementary concepts, such as community, rights, identity, the feeling of belonging, democracy etc, which, by closer inspection, in themselves are ambiguous and contested, too. Secondly, the meaning of citizenship and citizenship education is regarded as a historically changing phenomenon, inscribed as it is in the ongoing struggles and conflicts about the politics of the feeling of belonging. When the clarification of the meaning and use of the concept of citizenship is integrated in a context of a European institutional network, the Folk High Schools, adult education are becoming part of those practises, through which a democratic society is created, maintained, or restructured. If citizenship is incorporated in the basis of adult education, it has to be accepted that adult education is being part of ongoing and complex political and cultural processes and conflicts, through which the vitalisation of a democratic community is ensured.

In this paper I shall go deeper into exploring the consequences of the development and tendencies briefly outlined above, taking the starting point in the following questions,

- Why has citizenship gained a revival since the 1980s in the discourse of politics, culture, and education within the Western nation-states and political culture?
- What political and socio-cultural developments and conflicts can explain the renewed interest?
- What political and cultural challenges are connected with the concept of active citizenship as political and educational thinking?
- How is citizenship education to be imagined within the historical time of globalisation, cultural diversity, and European integration?

I shall try to clarify citizenship from historical, political, sociological, and educational angles in order to pinpoint the complexity and contested nature of the concept. The paper is divided into three parts. From political and historical-sociological viewpoints, part one seeks to explore the meaning and uses of citizenship, in order to trace its complexities and contested character. This is also the intention in part two, however, with a specific focus on the challenges deriving from the present processes of globalisation, and the emergence of a post-Westphalian and multicultural political order in Europe. Part three seeks to explore
three possible ways of envisaging the education for active citizenship in relation to the perspectives and challenges outlined in part one and two.

PART 1
Citizenship

Historically, the western understanding of the concept can be traced back to the political culture of the ancient Greek city state. The citizens were defined as free individuals, i.e. men, who were involved in the public affairs of the city-state. A citizen was connected to the civic virtues of Athenian democracy, which was marked by the subordination of the private life to the dedication to public affairs and the “common good” (Held, 1996: 17). The citizen was a “homo politicus”. With the political and social hegemony of Christianity during the Middle Ages this way of understanding citizenship eclipsed and was replaced by “homo credens”. A public political order or public life outside the religious order of Christianity was abandoned. The order of things was not connected to the public realm of republican commitment of the citizens, but to the commitment and subordination to the will of God.

The republican virtues of citizenship gained new foothold during the Renaissance in the Italian city-states. Still, it was the French revolution, starting in 1789, that provided the framework for thinking and practising citizenship within the formation of modern nation-states. Below I shall describe how the heritage of the French revolution is still with us today, and likewise the political and social processes that constitute important challenges to this heritage. However, before doing so it might be a good idea shortly to explore some features of the concept of citizenship from a more abstract and politically theoretical point of view.

From a politically theoretical point of view citizenship is what constitutes the membership of and belonging to a political community, and consequently the creation of and life as political subjects. Some of the central elements of citizenship, the formal, legal rights and duties of individuals and groups are establishing a legitimate sphere, according to which all members of the community in principle can act without arbitrary or unjust interference from other individuals or from the community. In a democracy it is the autonomy of individuals and groups as political agents that is the key guiding normative principle of the political life. The British political scientist David Held defines autonomy in this way in his book “Democracy and the Global Order (1995):

”[citizenship is] a principle that recognises the indispensability of “equal autonomy” for all citizens. If peoples’ equal interest in democracy is to be protected, they require an equal capacity to act across key political institutions and sites of power” (Held, 1995:71).

The belonging of autonomous citizens to a political community is centred around two key aspects. The first aspect is connected to the political institutions of society. The relations of individuals and groups to these institutions are structured around the formal, legal rights, and duties which the members of the community possess. The second aspect is concerned with the public activities through which the members of the community clarify and debate communal affairs. Here citizenship is not related directly to the formal and institutional
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feeling of belonging of the political subjects, but to the discussion and deliberating of communal affairs. Citizenship, according to this second aspect, is primarily related to the political identities that are expressed and created through the participation in the political public life of the community.

To be a member of a national or ethnic community, understood as a historical, cultural community, is not identical with citizenship membership. But it is also very important to stress the fact that categories of citizenship, i.e. membership of a political community, very often overlap those of cultural similarity. Citizenship in its stringent political interpretation can analytically be distinguished from cultural categories and identities, still, it is very difficult to do so in practice. Very often the understandings of citizenship bear more or less implicit imprints of ways in which citizenship is interpreted and understood within a specific culturally defined historical context.

As I intend to show later, citizenship gains a specific meaning in relation to the historical settings and socio-cultural conflicts that help establish and maintain the boundaries of a community. Because citizenship functions as a way of demarcating the boundaries of a community, and as a way of pointing out its members, it seems very difficult not to operate in the context of culturally defined categories and identities. In that respect the categories of citizenship are categories of identity and cultural policies.

It is in this perspective that Bryan S. Turner, the Australian sociologist, (1994) points out that citizenship is not merely concerned with the membership and status of a political community. Turner wants to avoid the tendency to restrict the meaning of citizenship only to be of political character. The concept also has to be placed within a broader sociological frame of reference. A sociological understanding of citizenship focuses upon the fact that citizenship identifies both a set of practises that are of social, legal, political and cultural character, and that these practises are institutionalised as normative social arrangements "(…) which determine membership of a community. Citizenship is the new fellowship (Genossenschaft) of the modern state. Within this perspective, cultural citizenship consists of those social practices which enable a competent citizen to participate fully in the national culture. Educational institutions (…) are thus crucial to cultural citizenship, because they are an essential aspect of socialisation of the child into this national system of values" (ibid:158)

In the following I shall take into consideration both the political and sociological understanding of citizenship. Thus, citizenship is an inclusive term that in different spheres deals with the ways in which community membership is created and recreated, and not the least, how and by whom the conditions of membership and feelings of belonging are constructed and limited. If we look more closely at one of the main sources for revitalising the concept of citizenship from the late 1980s this become apparent.
Politics of belonging: Exclusion/inclusion

In the booming interest and debate concerning citizenship in the Anglo-American world from the late 1980s until today the article “Citizenship and social Class” from 1950 by the British sociologist T.H. Marshall has been a central point of reference. Marshall’s article consists of a historical-sociological analysis of the development of modern citizenship. This might seem surprising, as his definition on citizenship is rather conventional:

“Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is bestowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties shall be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed” (Marshall:1994:17).

According to Marshall the development of citizenship is seen in the light of those rights and duties, that determine the legal status of membership of a community. Marshall’s analysis follows the development of these rights and duties of modern citizenship through three centuries. In the 18th century the civil rights were established, through which some basic rights of the individual were sanctioned: Freedom of speech, the right to private ownership, the right to enter contracts and equality before the law. The liberties of the individual were the main concern of civil rights. The task was to secure these liberties to everyone (in principle), through the construction of a legal system with the Court of Law as the institutional axis. The civil rights also had a narrower aim, viz. to secure that the individual could act and compete in the capitalistic market economy. In that respect, the codex of liberty of the civil rights corresponded to the development of modern capitalism.

In the 19th century the political rights were developed. These rights secured that individuals and groups had influence and were able to participate in exercising the political power, as members of a political group or party. Thus it became possible for hitherto politically excluded groups to mobilise in the political processes of society. The individual focus upon civil rights was reorganised in such a way that groups, parties, organisations and unions gained rights and power in the form of wages, better working conditions etc. Contrary to the civil rights, the political rights broke with the functional complementarity between citizenship and capitalism.

The last set of rights and duties was developed during the 20th century. The central elements are the social rights that grew out of the modern welfare-state of Western nation-states after the Second World War. Social security systems, policies of housing and education were some of the central features of social citizenship. The social rights of the welfare-state were to secure that the equality of the citizens was cut loose from social inequality which, from Marshall’s point of view, was an inherent and unavoidable logical consequence of capitalism.

However, nor is Marshall’s understanding of citizenship restricted to the formal rights and duties. In his definition of citizenship there is another and more informal aspect. Marshall adds the following dimension to his understanding of citizenship:
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“It was increasingly recognised, as the nineteenth century wore on, that political democracy needed an electorate, and that scientific manufacture needed educated workers and technicians. The duty to improve and civilise oneself is therefore a social duty, and not merely a personal one, because the social health of a society depends upon the civilisation of its members. And a community that enforces this duty has begun to realise that its culture is an organic unity and its civilisation a national heritage (ibid:16) (…) Citizenship requires a bond of a different kind, a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is in common possession. It is loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law” (ibid:23).

The socially constituted duties and loyalties are recognised as being the basis of the feeling of belonging to a culture, a national heritage. This is the second central feature of citizenship. Besides the formal status of the citizens, citizenship also contains socio-cultural bonds of belonging, “a direct sense of community”. In Marshall’s view it was the lack of education and economic resources that prevented the working class from being full members of the community and integrated in the common national culture. However, this could be obtained if the inequalities and conflicts of the capitalist society were modified and regulated by the social rights of the modern welfare-state. In Marshall’s view social citizenship, including education, was considered to be a crucial factor in maintaining the social and cultural coherence of society, and the factor that was able to generate and reproduce the communal loyalty and solidarity across class-divisions and conflicts.

The key to understand why Marshall’s analysis of the development of modern citizenship gained new interest during the 1980s is the way he operates with these two different, but complementary dimensions of the concept. Formal “universal” rights and duties on the one hand, and feelings of belonging and loyalty to a community on the other hand. Marshall is underlining that citizenship concerns the development of the feeling of belonging to and loyalty to a community in a very broad sense. Or formulated in another way, citizenship is about the “politics of belonging”, as Stuart Hall and David Held (1989) phrase it,

“From the ancient world to the present day, citizenship has entailed a discussion of, and a struggle over, the meaning and scope of membership of community in which one lives. Who belongs and what does belonging mean in practice (...) The issues around membership - who does and who does not belong - is where politics of citizenship begins. It is impossible to chart the history of the concept very far without coming sharply up against successive attempts to restrict citizenship to certain groups and to exclude others. In different historical periods different groups have led, and profited from this “politics of closure”: property-owners, men, white people, the educated, those in particular occupations or with particular skills, adults (Hall & Held, 1989: 175).

However, if one looks at citizenship from the point of view suggested by Hall & Held, what they call “politics of closure”, several blind spots and weaknesses in Marshall’s description and analysis of citizenship are revealed. Below I shall explore some of the criticism of Marshall, because in an exemplary manner they show that active citizenship as politics of belonging and education is a very complex and ambiguous phenomena.
The Members of Community

In the first place, it is not obvious that the development of citizenship rights and duties has reached a final ending point after the implementation of social rights of the national welfare-state. The British sociologist Anthony Giddens has criticised Marshall’s approach for being based on a too simple evolutionary thesis. If one accepts this thesis there is a possibility to overlook the fact that both the establishment of the social rights of the welfare-state, and the other rights too, were and still are the result of political and social struggle and conflict.

Giddens points out that the attack on the welfare-state in the 1980s by the British Conservative Government under Margaret Thatcher, can be regarded as a middle class reaction and as an opposition against the institutions and social arrangements that primarily were connected with the interests of the working-class and underprivileged groups. Giddens is drawing the attention to the fact that the growing interest in the concept of citizenship in the 1980s emerged in a period where Marshall’s hopes for the egalitarian power of citizenship were put under severe pressure by the neo-liberalist Conservative administration. Paradoxically, the interest in the concept of citizenship, and Marshall’s in particular, appears at a historical time where the consensus about the positive and progressive implications of social citizenship is undermined.

Seen from the the British right wing perspective, the promotion of active citizenship was not connected to the maintaining or extending of the social rights of the welfare-state. It is more likely that the welfare-state, in the social-liberal version that Marshall imagined, was considered to be a crucial factor in preventing and undermining active citizenship. Active citizenship was undermined because the welfare-state, or the “nanny-state” as it was called, did not promote individual engagement in the voluntary and private organisations which, from a Conservative point of view, were seen as the core of a responsible and active citizenship. Nor did the right wing agree on Marshall’s approach to capitalism. Douglas Hurd, the Conservative Home Secretary, stated this point in the following way:

"The idea of Active Citizenship is a necessary complement to that of enterprise culture. Public service may once have been the duty of an elite, but today it is the responsibility of all who have time or money. Modern capitalism has democratised the ownership of property, and we are now witnessing the democratisation of responsible citizenship

It is interesting to note that (active) citizenship became a key concept in the 1980s with the British left-wing, too. In the book “New Times” from 1989, prominent scholars on the left set out to explore how to redefine and renew the ideological basis and political agenda of western socialism. In the introduction to the book it was stated that the left-wing had to do so because of the profound changes that were restructuring western societies. Liberalism and post-Fordist capitalism were undermining the economic basis of the modern welfare state. In particular, this was seen as a consequence of the ways in which the “Thatcher-regime” was liberalising and deregulating British economy, liquidating the welfare-state.

This development, according to the authors of “New Times”, corresponded with similar tendencies in the late 1980s in Germany (Kohl), in the US (Reagan) and in France (Mitterand). The left-wing was considered to be in a severe political crisis since it was
difficult to see from which platform future progressive left-wing politics could be articulated. A problem that was reinforced by the fact that a very large percentage of the working class changed parties and became Conservative voters during the 1980s. It is in this context that the left re-established citizenship as a “new” discourse from where progressive left-wing politics could be articulated. Geoff Andrews states the purpose in this way,

“Citizenship therefore offers the left the possibility of ideological renewal, it could even become the much mooted ”Big Idea”, which has been missing from left politics generally” (ibid:14)

So, during the 1980s, both the left and the right “re-discovered” active citizenship as a key concept in the ongoing political struggle for power. But they did so according to opposite reasons, and with totally different political purposes.

The second problem in Marshall’s analysis is that he did not realise that the rise of modern citizenship did not take the same course of development in other nation-states as in Great Britain. Thus, Marshall’s analysis could be criticised for being Anglo-centric. From this outset Michael Mann, in his article “Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship” from 1987, explores the ways in which citizenship rights were developed and implemented with different priorities in different European nation-states and in different periods. He also shows that citizenship rights were a central part of “ruling class strategies”. Modern citizenship rights were functioning as an instrument in securing the stability and power of the dominant classes. Citizenship, in Mann’s perspective, is not only a source to equality and a key to moderate class divisions of society. According to Mann citizenship was a way to ensure, that the hegemony of the ruling classes remained intact. In the perspective of power relations citizenship is a much more ambiguous phenomenon than Marshall revealed. Citizenship rights, and particularly the social rights of the welfare-state, can function as sophisticated means in controlling, disciplining, and surveying a population.

In the third place, Marshall ignored that the political rights of the 19th century did not include women. From a feminist perspective Marshall’s evolutionary thesis is inscribed in a well-established patriarchal tradition for overlooking the fact that “universal” democratic political rights were shaped without half of the population being incorporated in this process in the first place. This gender-blindness is another power relation that is ignored by Marshall.

Finally, Marshall’s definition is characterised by another ambiguity. On the one hand, his way of speaking of the community is so vague that, in principle, it could include anything from the local community to the “global village”. In the light of Marshall’s account it should be possible to imagine active citizenship and the feeling of belonging on different community levels, a “multi-layered” citizenship so to speak. On the other hand, Marshall, in defining the dimension of the community, used phrases like an organic unity, and its civilisation a national heritage. Still, Marshall did not problematise this civilisation and national heritage which constitutes the frame of loyalty and the feeling of belonging. Marshall was operating on the implicit premise that the community of citizenship corresponded to the nation as an imagined community. Marshall himself did not discuss if the nation-state could serve as the overall frame for citizenship because he did not consider
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such a discussion necessary. However, this omission had two implications for considering citizenship which are important to bear in mind, and which I want to bring into focus below.

In Marshall’s perspective, the first implication for active citizenship is that Great Britain is looked upon as a culturally homogeneous and integrated entity. The consequence is that the cultural diversity of communities is ignored. However, the renewed interest in citizenship in the 1980s and particularly in the 1990s has revealed that there are other conflicts in the concept of the politics of the feeling of belonging than those connected to class divisions. Will Kymlicka, the Canadian political philosopher, formulates it in this way,

“It has become clear (…) that many groups - blacks, women, Aboriginal peoples, ethnic and religious minorities, gays and lesbians - still feel excluded from “the common culture”, despite possessing the common rights of citizenship. Members of these groups feel excluded not only because of their socio-economic status but also because of their socio-cultural identity - their difference” (Kymlicka, 1994:370).

The second implication is that it is overlooked that the status of the nation-state as a political and cultural community has been put under severe pressure from different processes of globalisation. These processes are questioning whether the status of the nation-state as a “naturalised” frame for active citizenship can or should be maintained. In other words, cultural diversity inside the nation-states, and globalisation are putting some very important questions that I want to explore in detail in the following,

- Can national communities serve as an adequate frame for the education of active citizenship? Should the future education for active citizenship favour the promotion of a national identity as politics of belonging?

- Or should this aim be given up in order to cope with the political, social and cultural changelessness that globalisation and cultural diversity are placing on the citizenship agenda? If yes, what are the alternatives? If no, what kind of national community should be promoted?

As far as I can see, these questions have to be dealt with, if education for active citizenship is to be considered meaningful in the future. If the purpose of education for active citizenship is to create an autonomous political subject, one has to place it in the perspective of globalisation and cultural diversity.

However, to do so it is required that the terms “globalisation” and “cultural diversity” are made clear. But to do so is not an easy or simple task. Like the concept of citizenship itself, the implications of globalisation and cultural diversity for the possible way of thinking citizenship and identity are essentially contested. Likewise, the implications for the national community which until today has been at the centre of citizenship education in Europe and most other places in the world. But before I proceed to explore the meaning and consequences of globalisation and cultural diversity, it is necessary to place citizenship in another historical setting. In doing so I intend to explore the close historical links between citizenship as a modern political institution, the process of nation-building, and the political education of the school.
Universalism versus particularism?

Hall & Held point out that the meaning of citizenship as a modern political concept is closely related to the French revolution in 1789, and particularly to the famous normative principles and virtues of liberty, equality and brotherhood. At the beginning of the revolution these virtues were based upon a universal thinking of revolutionary citizenship, according to which cultural differences were absorbed,

"(…) into one common universal status – the citizen (…) This language of universality and equality is what distinguished this moment – the moment of the "Rights of Man" – from earlier phases in the long march of citizenship (ibid: 176).

In his famous comparative study of the development of “Citizenship in Germany and France” from 1992, Rogers Brubaker is pointing out this distinctive universal moment of the revolution too. When the revolutionaries constituted themselves as “The national Assembly” they declared the sovereignty of the nation as a political entity too, in order to mark out that the revolution was to be regarded as a break with the political thinking of the “Ancient Regime” and its aristocratic and ecclesiastical dominance. However, membership of the national community was perceived in a universal and political understanding. The nation was not perceived in ethno-cultural terms. Thus, one of the famous revolutionaries Sieyes was able to define the nation in this way,

"What is a nation? A body of associates living under the common law and represented under the same legislature” (ibid: 7).

The French revolution in its outset took over the “laissez-faire” cosmopolitanism of the “Ancient Regime”. In principle everyone was invited to join the revolution which was considered to be the universal contribution to the benefit of mankind. However, this universal way of thinking was redefined radically during the revolution itself, particularly in continuation of the war with Prussia in 1792. From this historical moment the new revolutionary order was regarded as besieged and threatened by internal and external enemies. The revolutionary cosmopolitanism had a complementary element in the form of a xenophobic nationalism. In Brubaker’s view this was a turning point of the revolution that was as important as the introduction of democratic principles and republican citizenship.

From now on foreigners were persecuted and excluded from the revolution, their belongings were confiscated, and their staying in Paris forbidden. The explanation of this change of conceptualising community and politics could be seen as a logical consequence of the experiences of war, civil revolts, and internal struggles between the revolutionary factions. But why were foreigners in general regarded as potential enemies, and not only foreigners who belonged to hostile countries. Brubaker answers this question as follows,

"The answer has to do with the logic of the nation-state. A nation-state is a nation’s state, the state of and for a particular, bounded, sovereign nation, to which foreigners, by definition, do not belong. Legally homogenous internally, it is by virtue of this very fact more sharply bounded externally than a heterogeneous state such as pre-Revolutionary France. Sharp external boundedness does not dictate the terms on which resident foreigners are to be treated; but it does mark them clearly and axiomatically as outsiders –
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paradigmatic outsiders. By inventing the **national citizen** and the legally homogenous national citizenry, the revolution simultaneously invented the **foreigner**. Henceforth citizen and foreigner would be correlative, mutually exclusive, exhaustive categories (…) The nation-state may, indeed must, discriminate between citizens and foreigners. It is in this sense inherently nationalistic. Its nationalism needs not to be the aggressive or xenophobic sort of 1792 and after. More often it has a routine, normal taken-for-granted quality. Both sorts of nationalism – the normal ”background” nationalism of the nation-state and the noisy, bellicose variety descends to us from the French Revolution (ibid: 46-47).

Brubaker is of the opinion that out of the French revolution a political principle of the territorial demarcated nation-state was born as the frame for obtaining citizenship. In this connection the distinction between outsiders and insiders was of crucial importance. The insider was defined positively as a member of the national community, the outsider was defined negatively as an outsider, as a foreigner or a “stranger”. Thus, the modern concept of citizenship was closely related to the exclusion and construction of outsiders and strangers. The legitimacy and efficiency of citizenship, and the sovereignty of the nation-state, depended on the capacity of differentiating between the individuals and groups that were considered to be members of the national community, and the ones who were not. In its historical outset citizenship as a modern political institution was nationalist, too. Or rather, that this ambiguity between the universalism of human rights and the cultural particularism of the national community became an inherent feature of citizenship that is still with us today.

Foreigners born in France could relatively easily obtain the status of full citizenship. In the French political culture “jus soli” or place of birth became the guiding principle for obtaining citizenship. In principle this inclusive practice was connected with a strategy of assimilating the “strangers”. The price that had to be paid for membership of the French nation and thus to obtain citizenship rights was the duty to accept to be French, to be loyal to the French nation, and to go through the cultural process of cultural homogenisation of the educational system.

In Brubaker’s view citizenship as a national practice of exclusion and inclusion is linked with a standardised national programme of political education through which the loyalty towards and belonging to the French republic was ensured. The construction of citizenship and national identity goes hand in hand with the construction of a centralised educational system.

So, if we accept the general perspective of Brubaker’s argument, there has historically been a close affinity between the consolidation of the territorial nation-state as a political entity, the construction of national identity, and citizenship. And there has been a close affinity between citizenship, cultural homogenisation and the oppression of cultural diversity. A main vehicle in constructing these affinities has been the educational system controlled by the nation-state. All over the world this is still the case. The link between citizenship and the promotion of national identity and the feeling of belonging are functioning as a global phenomenon. However, this does not mean that these links have to be preserved in the future. Ongoing processes of globalisation call them into question.
PART 2
Globalisation

At the same historical time where globalisation has become a key word both in social sciences, and gradually in the everyday life of many people, and in political discourses in general, the interest in citizenship has met with a Renaissance. It has to be stated that it is difficult to specify the concise meaning of the phenomenon. One problem is that the concept can be used as regards the development and dynamics in very different spheres of social life, as for instance economy, politics, culture, environment, international relations etc. Another problem has to do with the history of globalisation, such as: Are the ongoing processes of globalisation an expansion, a radical break with or perhaps a slowing down compared to earlier phases of globalisation. A third problem concerns the normative implication of globalisation: Is globalisation something to be celebrated, controlled and reduced or even combated? Therefore, as a starting point in pinpointing some of the general features of globalisation, it is good idea extensively to quote the British political scientist, David Held, on this,

“(…) globalisation can be taken to denote the stretching and deepening of social relations and institutions across space and time such that, on the one hand, day-to-day activities are increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the globe and, on the other, the practices and decisions of local groups and communities can have significant global reverberations. Accordingly, globalisation can be conceived as "action at distance". The particular form of action at distance that is of concern here is engendered by the stretching and deepening of relations across the borders of nation-states and at increasing intensity. Globalisation thus interpreted implies at least two distinct phenomena. First, it suggests that many chains of political, economic and social activity are becoming worldwide in scope. And, secondly, it suggests there has been an intensification of levels of interaction and interconnectedness within and between states and societies. What is new about the modern global system is the stretching of social relations in and through new dimensions of activity – technological, organisational, administrative and legal, among other – and the chronic intensifications of patterns of interconnectedness mediated by such phenomena as modern communication networks and new information technology. Politics unfolds today, with all its customary uncertainty and indeterminateness, against the background of a world shaped and permeated by the movement of goods and capital, the flow of communication, the interchange of cultures and the passage of people” (ibid: 20-21).

In the study of globalisation Held’s definition can be characterised as a transformational position in the study of globalisation. According to this position globalisation is not characterising a condition, but a process or set of processes. These processes are not bound together by a simple or linear developmental logic. The interaction and interchange of networks, communities, states, international institutions, NGOs, multinational companies etc. create a complex “global order” that is not coherent in any simple sense. The constant creations and breakdowns of the global networks of relations expand the possibilities for individual and collective action, at the same time restricting them. Because globalisation consists of uneven developmental processes, and has different consequences in different parts of the world, because globalisation
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"(…) both reflects existing patterns of inequality and hierarchy while also generating new patterns of inclusion and exclusion, new winners and losers” (Goldblatt et al, 1999: 27).

Globalisation is not creating a new world order of universal equality. It is rather reproducing power-relations at a distance. So, according to the transformative view, globalisation is marked by a set of processes that are partly simultaneous and complementary, and partly opposed to and in conflict with each other. On the one hand, the extension and speed of economic, political and cultural activities are reducing the relevance of territorial boundaries. On the other hand, globalisation is reproducing or even intensifying the search for and need for the very same boundaries. Simultaneously globalisation is about de-territorialization and re-territorialization. Territorial boundaries seem less important in the global network of relations, however, at the same time attempts are made to strengthen them. For instance political activities and decisions are extended and intensified beyond the national level, in the NATO, the EU, the NAFTA, the WTO etc. On the other hand, conflicts all over the world are concerning the struggle for the fortification of ethnic and national politics. So, in Roland Robertson’s words (1995) globalisation is connected to localisation. Or rather, these two processes are intertwined to such an extent that Robertson suggest that the neologism “glocalisation” should be used. It is difficult to predict, whether this global-local nexus is a source of conflict or not.

Globalisation implies that power, knowledge, wealth, and decisions are centralised in international organisations and transnational companies. At the same time a diffusion and decentralisation are going on, for instance in the form of the activities and involvement of ethno-national movements and NGOs on the political arenas. Globalisation means that global capitalism is de-regulated or liberalised, but at the same time institutions and networks are established with the purpose of re-regulating it. The EU and the WTO are examples of the latter phenomenon.

The historical perspective of the transformative position means that globalisation is not considered to be a new phenomenon. Globalisation in its actual form marks a continuity with earlier phases of globalisation. But the assertion is that the ongoing processes of globalisation are unique, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as regards speed, extensity, and intensity. Processes of globalisation are now effecting all areas of social activity, on both local, national, regional, and trans-regional levels.

Globalisation is changing the established world order of states, “the Westphalian Order”, that until the end of the Second World War regulated the political and military relations between and inside states. The Westphalian Order is a codex of normative principles that after the peacemaking at the end of The Thirty Years’ War in 1648 decided that the highest political authority was centred around sovereign and territorially well-defined states that acted as autonomous political agents. These principles changed the feudal political “order” in which power was fragmented into many local units with vague boundaries, often anchored in and personalised by the power of local lords. The Westphalian order gained its present meaning with the consolidation of modern nation-states with fixed boundaries, according to which there should be no authority above the nation-state. The nation-state introduced three innovations compared with earlier forms of state-making. In the first place, territorial borders between states were fixed. Secondly, modern nation-states succeeded in
monopolising the means of violence. And the nation-states shaped the frame for the innovation of a modern principle of legitimacy.

"It was only when claims to divine right or state right were challenged and eroded that it became possible for human beings as "individuals" and "peoples" to win a place as "active citizens" in the political order. The loyalty of citizens became something that had to be won by modern states: invariably this involved a claim by the state to be legitimate because it reflected and/or represented the views and interests of its citizens" (ibid:49).

The development of democracy and the modern western understanding of citizenship takes place within the Westphalian Order of nation-states. We might make a distinction between the institutionalisation of centralised territorial states, the building of national communities, and liberal democracies since these processes never overlap in any simple way. And it must be emphasised that we see these processes be simultaneous processes only in a limited part of the Westphalian Order. Anyway, the modern nation-state claim a symmetry between sovereignty, legitimacy and territory during the 19th and 20th centuries. The effect of this is the construction of "a national community of fate", whereby membership of the political community is defined in terms of peoples within the territorial borders of the nation-state; this community becomes the proper locus and home of democratic politics” (Goldblatt et al., 1999:29).

But what does this very brief outlining of globalisation mean in relation to active citizenship? Seen from a transformative perspective the most important question is whether the territorial nation-states can maintain their status as sovereign political entities in the future.

Again some contradictory tendencies can be discovered. On the one hand, the speed and extensity by which global networks of bureaucracies, institutions, and multilateral agreements are established indicate that “global governance has become a reality”. The global interconnectedness has meant that the nation-states are lacking political instruments to be effective actors on the global political arena. The power of the nation-state is gradually eroding. If this is the case, the link between citizenship and nation-state that historically has been closely connected is under severe pressure or even in a process of erosion.

On the other hand, there is no such thing as a coherent “world society” that constitutes a clear and unified alternative. This means that we are all connected to several political communities of fate, so far without a central locus from which citizenship can be understood.

"questions are raised both about the fate and the appropriate locus for the articulation of the democratic political good. If the agent at the heart of modern political discourse, be it a person, a group or a collectivity, is locked into a variety of overlapping communities – "domestic" and "international" – then the proper "home" of politics and democracy becomes a puzzling matter” (ibid:225).
In other words, questions are raised which communities ought to be the central loci for active citizenship? According to the transformative position this is an open question.

- Is active citizenship to be imagined within the political and cultural frames of the nation-state?
- Who are the people or the central democratic “we” in a possible post-Westphalian Order?
- What constitutes the central “demos” of democracy, and how is it to be put together?

If these questions are not somehow integrated into the education of active citizenship it is hard to figure out the meaning of the term.

If active citizenship is imagined in the perspective of the autonomy of the members of community, it cannot be ignored that it is still more problematic to determine which community ensures this autonomy. From the transformative point of view the challenge is to understand that the connection between the Westphalian Order of nation-states as political communities of fate and citizenship is changing radically these years. However, at the same time it is a good idea to make clear, that the transformative way of thinking is far from being the only one in the study of globalisation, and particularly its consequences for considering active citizenship. So, in the following I would like to briefly outline two positions within the social sciences which disagree with the transformative views.

**Hyperglobalists and Sceptics**

Generally the hyper-globalists argue that the era of the nation-state is over. The present state of globalisation is marking out an epochal break with the political order of the nation-states. Thanks to economic globalisation, the nation-states have lost control over the national economies. As a result of the “disorganised capitalism”, national economies are becoming a fiction. Capitalism has become a global electronic casino beyond the political control of the nation-states. If the economic resources are out of control, the national governments are no longer able to guarantee the citizens a secure life and future. For the possibility of imagining active citizenship this has far reaching consequences. This has been formulated by Zygmunt Bauman, the famous sociologist, in his book “In Search of Politics” (1999),

“Globalization of capital, finances and information means first and foremost their exemption from local, and above all nation-state control and administration. In the space in which they operate there are no institutions reminiscent of the vehicles which the republican state has developed for citizen participation and effective political action. And where there are no republican institutions, there is no “citizenship” either (Bauman, 1999:170).

Social security and justice that have been in the hands of the national welfare-states are undermined, and Bauman does not at all trust the possibility of trying to revitalise the power of the nation-state when it comes to thinking active citizenship. In Bauman’s somehow pessimistic tone globalisation is resulting in an increasing social polarisation
between the new economic elite who has turned away from citizenship obligations and community loyalties, and the majority of citizens whose fate is in the hands of political institutions without power. The result of globalisation is a new form of global socio-economic stratification, a redefined global “class”-structure with new losers and winners.

The sceptics are in opposition to this view. According to the sceptics the present state of globalisation is not marking a radical break with former processes of globalisation. The transformative people and the hyperglobalistst are making too hasty conclusions regarding the power and influence of the nation-states as political agents. A sceptic like the sociologist Michael Mann (1997) does not deny a globalised economy as a fact. But this does not mean that the power of the nation-states is being eroded, since the nation-states are not the victims of globalisation, but its architects. To a great extent capitalism and globalisation are under the control of three clusters of nation-states, in Europe, North-America and Southeast Asia. In these three regions of nation-states, 85 pct of the world-trade is controlled, and 90 pct of the production in the advanced sectors and almost all multinational companies are situated there. With this in mind, Mann does not foresee a situation in the near future beyond the political power of the global system of the nation-state because

“[…] it is almost inconceivable that the bulk of the privileges of national citizens in northern countries could be removed. That would cause such social disorder as to be incommensurate with the stable and profitable capitalism. The nation-state provides some of the structure, and some of the stratification structure, of the global networks of capitalism. If the commodity rules, it only does so entwined with the rules of – especially northern – citizenship” (ibid:480).

Therefore, in the light of what might be called the macro-perspective of globalisation we have to conclude: It is essentially contested which community sets the frame for active citizenship in the future. So it is an open and contested issue whether the close link between national community of fate and active citizenship can or should be maintained. This contested issue turns up again if we look at the ways in which the term “politics of identity” has been a central feature of political thinking in the last decade in Western democracies. A feature that has gained new importance as a result of the global processes of migration.

**Migration and Politics of Identity**

Migration in its simple form refers to the “the movement of people and their temporary or permanent geographical relocation” (Goldblatt et al: 1999: 283-326). Movements of migration as a global phenomenon are not new, but must be considered as being social processes related to the history of mankind as such. In this context I shall concentrate on the movements of migration that have occurred since the Second World War, and particularly their political and cultural impact upon Western democracies.

Movements of migration have had three important impacts. In the first place, European nation-states have had to include an increasing number of individuals and groups from former colonies and non-European cultures. Secondly, European nation-states are becoming
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multicultural and multiethnic in a way and to an extent unknown in modern history. And thirdly, the effect has been as follows,

"The autonomy of nation-states is being redefined by the impact of past legal migrations and the continuing impact of illegal migration (...) notions of citizenship and national identity are being renegotiated in response to contemporary patterns of global migration and cultural globalisation. But in many cases the trajectory of these negotiations is far from clear (ibid:326)

The renegotiations of citizenship and national identity have had many turning points. A central issue is whether the community framing active citizenship in the future is to be found on the national, the supra-national, or the sub-national level.

Rogers Brubaker (1992) agrees with the fact that citizenship as a practice of inclusion and exclusion has been put under serious pressure as a result of immigration to western democracies. In that respect it still seems very important to nation-states to control the immigration. He also agrees that the nation-state is committed to bilateral and multilateral agreements on an international and global level that restrict the sovereignty of the nation-states in deciding who should be given the rights of citizenship. For instance, the non-citizens that have gained a status as immigrants, and who have permanent residence in the new country do possess most of the same citizenship rights as the ones who have the status of full citizenship. In that perspective the dimension of formal status as citizens has become less important, both for the nation-states and for the immigrants. However, this does not mean that citizenship has become a less important and contested issue. But a change has taken place in the political relevance as a result of the immigration and expanding cultural diversity,

"Proposals to redefine the legal criteria of citizenship raise large and ideologically charged questions of nationhood and of belonging to a state. Debates about citizenship (...) are debates about what it means to belong to the nation-state. The politics of citizenship today is first and foremost a politics of nationhood. As such, it is politics of identity, not a politics of interest (in the restricted, materialistic sense). It pivots more on self-understanding than on self-interest. The "interests" informing the politics of citizenship are ideal rather than material. The central question is not "who gets what"? But rather "who is what?" (ibid:182).

The meaning and importance of citizenship has shifted from the material to the moral-symbolic level of politics of identity and feeling of belonging. It might be stated that the nation-states are losing sovereignty in the formal and institutional sense of the term. But when the issue is the politics of identity and the feeling of belonging the nation-states are still very much in power, and according to Brubaker there seems to be no indication that alternative political or cultural communities can take over this position. Those who foresee the end or the erosion of the nation-states underestimate the power of national identities. Proponents of post-national scenarios do not realise that national communities are not only ethno-demographic phenomena or a set of institutions, but also “crucially a way of thinking about and appraising political and social membership”.

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In her article “Changing Citizenship in Europe” (1996) and in her book “Limits of Citizenship” Yasemin Soysal argues that the post-national scenario that Brubaker refuses so far, is in fact in the process of becoming a reality. The connection between the two central elements of citizenship, rights and identities, are in the process of being decoupled. Soysal points to several events that give grounds to her assumptions. The post-Second World War internationalised labour market has resulted in intensive movements of migration to Europe. Decolonialisation has resulted in the fact that new independent nation-states have claimed their status as legitimate actors on the global political arena according to universal rights of international law, for instance through their participation in the UN and UNESCO. Political entities, for instance the EU, have been established that de-connect the link between citizenship and nation-state boundaries. Finally, and important for Soysal’s line of arguments, she states as follows:

"As legitimised and celebrated by various international codes and laws, the discourse of human rights ascribes universal rights to the person, independent of membership status in a particular nation state. Even though they are frequently violated as a political practice, human rights increasingly constitute a world-level index of legitimate action and provide a hegemonic language for formulating claims to rights above and beyond national belonging” (ibid:19).

"Thus, universal personhood replaces nationhood (…) The rights and claims of individuals are legitimated by ideologies grounded in a trans-national community, through international codes, conventions and laws of human rights, independent of their citizenship in a nation state. Hence, the individual transcends the citizen. This is the most elemental way that post-national model differs from the national model” (ibid:23)

According to a hyperglobalist such as Soysal, globalisation and movements of migration mean that universal and human rights standards of post-national citizenship have replaced national ones. Citizenship is not anchored in one privileged community membership. Citizenship is related to a multiplicity of memberships, not limited to the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. A new model for thinking citizenship in non-territorial identities, feelings of belonging, and universal rights is a reality. Although Soysal states that this way of thinking citizenship is encountered with resistance the tendency is clear.
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As a third way of thinking citizenship in relation to globalisation, migration and politics of identity, the points of view of the British sociologist Stuart Hall might be of interest. In his article “The Question of Cultural Identity (1992) he states that national identities remain strong concerning legal and citizenship rights (ibid: 302). On the other hand his analysis of the impact on European nation-states of cultural globalisation and migration might help us specify some central challenges concerning the relationship between cultural diversity and active citizenship.

Halls wants to point out that there are three different consequences of cultural globalisation. Most people’s social life is becoming part of the global inter-change of commercial, standardised consumer-goods. To a great extent, distinct cultural traditions and identities are cut loose, or disembedded from local or national communities, now being part of the “global supermarket” or the commercial “global village” of cultural homogenisation. However. the success of the marketing of western ways of life and consumer-culture has resulted in the fact that people are emigrating to the west. The purpose of marketing the western way of life was to incorporate the rest of the world into a homogenous consumer culture, dominated by western economies.

Paradoxically, this strategy has led to the result that western nation-states are being culturally heterogeneous because the “rest” have become a internal part of the west through global movements of migration. In other words, what was considered to be the cultural periphery of western culture is now becoming a part of the west: The “Rest” is in the “West”. The attempts to centralise the global inter-change of culture around a western hegemony has resulted in the fact that the West is being culturally decentralised. Cultural diversity or difference are becoming more pressing feature of Western nation-states than ever before. There are several important consequences of this which point in the opposite direction of cultural homogenisation of globalisation. First:

"The formation of ethnic-minority "enclaves” within the nation-states of the West has led to a ”pluralization” of national cultures and national identities (...) The first effect has been to contest the settled contours of national identity, and to expose its closure to pressures of difference, ”otherness” and cultural diversity. This is happening, to different degrees, in all the Western national cultures and as a consequence it has brought the whole issue of national identity and cultural ”centredness” of the West into the open” (ibid:307).

If we accept that the creation of identities is a central feature of citizenship and the feeling of belonging to a community Hall points to other consequences of the cultural decentering of the West. On the one hand, attempts are made to strengthen the markers of local, ethnic, national, cultural and religious identities. People are engaged in the activity of making the boundaries of identity and community with an homogenous or monocultural essence. On the other hand, Hall says, new hybrid identities are in a process of being created that have other central features.

"Everywhere, cultural identities are emerging which are not fixed, but poised, in transition between different positions; which draw on different cultural traditions at the same time;
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and which are the product of those complicated cross-overs and cultural mixes which are increasingly common in a globalised world” (ibid:310).

Hall is of the opinion that politics of identity below the level of the national community is becoming a still more central feature of western politics because of migration and cultural globalisation. The dynamic of this is what Hall calls “the new social movement” i.e. identity politics of race, ethnicity, religious communities, women, sexual minorities etc. The origin of these movements is to be found in the 1960s in the USA, for instance in the political feminist and anti segregation movements. What these groups had in common was that they felt marginalized from the established political culture. In order to be accepted they reclaimed the identities that were stigmatised in society in general. In order to do so they valorised the stigmatised pole of oppositions of black/white, man/female, heterosexual/homosexual etc. In this way difference became as important as commonality.

The possibility for modern citizens to create stable and firm identities including a well-defined feeling of content has been put under pressure by cultural globalisation and cultural differences within national cultures, more or less in the shape of territorially concentrated cultural minorities. "Politics of difference” makes it still more difficult to decide which community should be the locus of citizenship and democratic community. In Halls view “difference is the joker in the citizenship pack”. If it has to be pointed out where to find the most important issues concerning active citizenship, and the most progressive potential in modern politics too, Stuart Hall would point to the impact of the new social movements at the level below the nation-state.

Models of European Citizenship

This way of thinking citizenship rights and identities at different political levels, exemplified above, is an important feature in the present European context. To decide whether the future political anchoring of citizenship is be thought and practised within the framework of the nation-state, or within a supra-national political order, or rather at a sub-nation-state level, is one of the key issues of European politics. The three levels are neither easy to accommodate to each other, nor are they necessarily mutually exclusive. But both in respect of separating or uniting these three levels, it constitutes one of the key challenges of European democracy within the framework of the EU.

One approach to the EU is that it is best constructed according to the existing nation-state model. The nation-state provides the most stable and viable democratic structures and institutions of Europe. The autonomy and sovereignty of a nation-state are to be maintained in order to ensure the popular legitimacy of democratic institutions and traditions, and should therefore be at the centre of the future political development of the EU. It may be added that the nation-state is also considered to be the best platform for meeting the challenges of globalisation. If the EU is to be reformed, or if competencies and power are to be relegated to EU-institutions, it should be done in order to strengthen the nation-states and should rely on the legitimacy of decision-making on a national level. This approach is often called the con-federal model of the EU, and so far constitutes a hegemonic feature of EU-politics.
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A second approach, called federalism, argues that the democratic deficit and missing legitimacy of the EU should be met by creating new representative institutions at EU level. The centre of European democracy should be a EU-legislature and government. In this model the diffusion of political power and autonomy is turned around, compared to the confederate model, in that it goes from the EU to the national level. Seen from a federalist point of view the present EU is constituted as an “in-between” arrangement, at the same time consisting of a national claim of Westphalian sovereignty, and the federal-like legal jurisdiction in the shape of the European Commission. According to the federal thinking this unresolved “in-between situation” is likely to undermine the legitimacy and authority of the EU. It is necessary to create a new pan-European constitution for a European federal state and assembly.

It is interesting to note that citizenship has become part of the EU. “Citizenship of the European Union”, being part of the Maastricht Treaty, and coming into force on November 1st 1993, and it might be considered as a re-framing of the concept of citizenship, a move from a national to a post- or supra-national form of citizenship. If this is the case, one might claim that federal aspirations are becoming a reality, and that we are witnessing a process of a radical change in the European citizenship. Seen from a federal point of view Citizenship of the European Union may be regarded as an important stepping-stone for the advancement of a supra-national citizenship, in that it replaces the criterion of nationality with an objective criterion of residence. However, it is important to note, as Marco Martinello (1994) does, that the citizenship of the European Union is an ambiguous phenomenon.

“The granting of these political rights (the rights to vote and be elected in the local elections and the elections of the European parliament in the member’s state of residence, my comment) is sometimes presented as a critical step towards the defeat of the nation-state, in the sense that it apparently dissociates the possession of nationality, that is the belonging to a nation on the one hand, and the possession and exercise of citizenship – understood as a set of rights and duties linked to the state - on the other. In my view this is not the case. The concept of citizenship of the European Union introduced in Maastricht, is still largely derived from the national concept of citizenship. As a matter of fact, it does not create any new juridical and political subject. The main condition to be recognised as a citizen of the Union is to be a citizen of one of the member states, that is a national one of the member states (…) Citizenship of the European Union does not break the association between citizenship and nationality but renews it in a slightly different way (ibid: 34-35).

In other words, a precondition for obtaining the status of European citizenship is that it is directly related to nationality, in that one can be a citizen of the European Union only if one is Danish, Finnish, French etc. In this way the conflict between confederates and pan-European federalism is immanent in the concept of European citizenship, which can be seen as the highest denominator of political consensus among the EU-elites. What has been constructed is a two-level model in which supra-national rights are depending on national belonging (Castles & Davidson, 2000: 98). In this way the historical role of national cultural identities in securing political cohesion is confirmed. It is in this perspective that Martinello states that the main purpose of the introduction of European citizenship is not to renew an inclusive and democratised notion of citizenship. Rather it is linked to the process
of creating a European cultural identity from above. Citizenship of the European Union is inscribed in a process of a “culturalization” process of Europe.

According to Martinello, this is being done according to two options (Martinello, 1994: 38-39). The first option is “traditional”, which is based on the myths of the Judeo-Christian and humanist heritage, based on a “European spirit”. The second is “the constructivist option” based on the programme of constructing “a common European space” as a result of a conscious political action in fields like plurilingualism, education and universities, communication etc. Martinello argues that one aim of constructing this European cultural identity and space is connected to the construction and exclusion of “the other”, i.e. immigrants from Islamic cultures and cultural minorities which might challenge the myth of European homogeneity, and which might formulate alternative notions of “europeanness” from below.

A third approach could be called “a Europe of regions”. In this model sub-state and regional communities, in the shape of for instance Catalonia, Lombardy, Baden-Württemberg, the Øresund-region of Denmark and Sweden and central institutions of the EU form the axis of European politics. By relegating power and autonomy to the regions it is argued that the state-centralising effect of the two other approaches could be avoided, and the EU be democratised in the name of “diversity in unity”. In opposition to supporters of the nation-state model several ethno-national, regional movements in Europe, for instance in Spain (Catalonia and the Basque-country), in the UK (Scotland, Wales and West-Midland), Italy (Lega Nord, Lombardy), Belgium (the Flemish-region) consider that the strengthening of the EU may go hand in hand with the decentralising effect of a regionalised political space in Europe. In this way it can be ensured that political participation is anchored in the ethno-cultural communities which most people identify themselves with and feel that they are belonging to. In this model the strengthening of local or sub-state ethno-cultural identities and the expanding EU integration are regarded as complementary features, in order to weaken the political power and cultural hegemony of the centralised nation-states. With the future integration of several national and ethnic minorities within Eastern Europe into the EU, this model might become a still more pressing feature of the EU.

To these three models could be added a fourth one which is often called the cosmopolitan model. In this model the effort to lay down the future European politics upon either of the three levels is given up. To continue the struggle between confederate, federal or regional models is like offering a never ending and in a democratic perspective unfruitful process. The consequences of globalisation processes are precisely that they are eroding the effort to define citizenship and the politics of the feeling of belonging within territorial boundaries or state institutions. The different spheres of politics, including nation-state, pan European federalism, regionalism and non-territorial politics of old and new social movements, are intermingling and interrelated to such an extent that they are mutually supporting the existence of each other, though not in any harmonious and non-conflicting sense of the term. In the cosmopolitan model there is no privileged territorial unit from where sovereignty and autonomy can be relegated, and there is no primary source of popular legitimacy. In this model the post-Westphalian Order of the day forms the basis of the political agenda of Europe.
“Once it is conceded that societies require a range of democratic channels to exercise democratic rights effectively, supra-national, transnational, and sub-state aspects of political authority can be understood to extend rather than delimit popular empowerment. To strengthen institutions at one “level” does not imply weakened institutions at other levels; on the contrary, the overall “quantity” of democracy rises as democratic accountability increases across the various levels. In a transnational context, non-state democratic institutions complement state democracy rather than undermine it, and have a positive-sum rather than a zero-sum effect” (Goodman, 1997, 183).

Is an open question which of these models is able to become a hegemonic feature of the future European development. So far we can only conclude that Europe is constituted as a relatively open field of political dispute in which a complex set of actors, individuals as well as collectivities, are struggling for power.

PART 3
Education for Active Citizenship and Multiculturalism

In the following I would like to explore how to imagine an education for active citizenship according to some of the challenges and conflicts outlined in part one and two. Before I try to do so, I would like to underline what I consider to be fundamental to such a task. In other words, I would like to outline the unavoidable premises for formulating education for active citizenship. Premises that are derived from the above description of citizenship and the challenges and conflicts that are connected to this phenomenon.

My research has shown that citizenship is an essentially contested concept with no fixed meaning or definition. The meaning and content of the concept takes form according to the political and cultural contexts in which it is inscribed. The political and cultural challenges and conflicts that intrinsically are connected to citizenship are historically constituted. The most important challenges and conflicts at the beginning of the 21st century are not the same as for instance in the aftermath of the Second World War, when T.H. Marshall published his article “Citizenship and Social Class”, although some overlapping is obvious.

If active citizenship is to be meaningful in educational thinking and practice the historical context has to be clarified. Above I have outlined that citizenship involves two central aspects: Formal rights and duties on the one hand, and a more informal aspect that concerns the belonging to a community on the other. Citizenship, in my view, seems meaningless if it is not clarified which community should guarantee the institutionalisation of rights and duties, and which community the citizens are intended to belong to. Of course, citizenship rights involve a universal element, for instance global human rights, which in principle are not restricted to specific individuals, groups, or communities. But individuals, groups, and communities do not exist in a world without boundaries. In other words, citizenship involves political and cultural actives that seek to specify these boundaries, or rather who are thought to be members of a given community and who are not? Who can or shall be given the status of citizenship, which rights should be given to whom?

If citizenship is thought of as a political, social, cultural, and educational practice of a given community, citizenship is intrinsically linked to the activity of a boundary-construction
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which helps to determine who are included in the community, and who should be excluded. There is no citizenship without the practice of inclusion and exclusion. But the practice of inclusion and exclusion puts some complicated questions as they are not “natural” or God-given phenomena, but political issues: Who is in the position to determine the criteria of inclusion/exclusion, and who has the power to settle the boundaries of a community? Further intricate problems are a result of this question. In a democracy inclusion/exclusion criteria are somehow to be based upon “the rule of the people” to obtain political legitimacy. Therefore, more or less rationally, deliberately, and willingly “the people” have to accept and express loyalty to community decisions. In order to do so it has to be ensured that the collective identities of members of the community are established and kept alive. If this is not ensured citizenship is in danger of falling apart in a democracy. In other words, citizenship as the practice of inclusion and exclusion is bound to the politics of identity and this is intrinsically linked to the power-relations of society.

Processes of globalisation, among many things, and movements of migration are challenging the ways in which membership of and loyalty to a community should be settled. Political and cultural development above and below the nation-state raises some questions concerning the status and power of national communities being the central locus for citizenship. Citizenship in a European democratic context is faced with two key challenges that are of central importance for the ways in which education for citizenship could be imagined and realised in the future:

- Is Europe, with the EU as the central dynamic, facing a post-national development, or is the European integration rather a process of fortifying the nation-states?
- How is citizenship to be thought in a situation of expanding globalisation and cultural diversity both within the EU and within the nation-state?

In order to comply with these challenges, a first step might be to introduce the concept of “multiculturalism”. As a concept in the philosophy of education and political theory it is well known in the Anglo-American world. The concept also figures in many ways of thinking and implementing social policies in the US, Canada and Australia. However, as was the case with the concept of citizenship this fact does not mean that there is consensus about the meaning and implications of it. I propose to define multiculturalism as

"(...) politics of multiculturalism – the relations between groups and cultures – within a pluralistic, or "liberal", society, which involves struggles for equal recognition on behalf of minority cultures (Parekh, 1997:164). (...) multiculturalism is a normative doctrine advancing a specific view on how we should respond to cultural diversity, and entailing significant regulatory policy recommendations” (ibid: 169).

According to this definition, it is not determined in advance that multiculturalism deals with cultural, ethnic or religious minorities per se, or necessarily the relationships between these groups and a majority culture. Multiculturalism is understood as an inclusive concept, which in a broad sense deals with “the proper terms of relationship between cultural communities”. It has to be determined by the historical and political context in question which relations and which kinds of cultural diversity are in focus, and these are not fixed in
advance. But in order to introduce it as part of the concept of citizenship education, some elementary premises must form the basis.

At first, multiculturalism exists in several different and conflicting versions. Multiculturalism is an essentially contested concept. Secondly, multiculturalism does not implicate that national communities are ignored or necessarily devalued. If multiculturalism is going to make any sense in the present historical situation of the European nation-states, it seems unrealistic not to incorporate a national perspective. Therefore, in the present situation the question is not if a national element has to be included, but rather in what specific version. Multiculturalism is meant to facilitate a multi-perspective approach that makes room for as many viewpoints as possible in the process of clarifying, which formal rights and duties, and which identities might keep a certain multicultural community together, or which might threaten to tear it apart.

In the following I shall state three possible ways of considering multiculturalism in the view of the premises in relation to citizenship education. The focus of the first two positions is primarily on the citizenship education at the primary schools. However, I believe that the viewpoints could be used in a broader perspective of citizenship education. As the first example, I draw the attention to David Miller’s viewpoints (1995) that are especially focusing upon his attempt to place the democratic education of the school in his defence of the national community. As the second example, I shall use Yael Tamir, the political theorist, who makes room for multiculturalism in a liberal and partly European perspective. As the third position I draw the attention to the account of Bhikhu Parekh (1997, 2000). His position could be regarded as a hybrid between the three versions of multiculturalism seen from the point of view of a deliberative concept of democracy.

The outlining of these three positions could be regarded as a process of “thinning out” the role and importance of the national community and identity in the future education for active citizenship. A national element is incorporated in all of them, but based upon different premises as far as the concepts of democracy and politics of identity are concerned.

**Education for Active citizenship: A Republican model**

The British political theorist David Miller argues in his book “On Nationality” (1995) that “*civic nationalism*” and a republican concept of democracy should constitute the foundation of the future citizenship education. Michael Walzer has tried to capture the key element of a republican concept of democracy in this way,

"To live well is to be politically active, working with our fellow citizens, collectively determining our common destiny – not for the sake of this or that determination but for the work itself, in which our highest capacities as rational and moral agents find expression. We know ourselves best as persons who propose, debate and decide” (Walzer in Mouffe: 1992:91)

In a republican concept of democracy the citizens can form their personal and social identity only if they share traditions and common institutions, and through the obligation to
participate in public discourse about “the common good” (Habermas, 1994: 345). According to Miller, these features of republican democracy and citizenship are best realised in a context of civic nationalism. Civic nationalism is understood as a form of nationalism that is rooted in modern political principles such as democracy and egalitarian citizenship. This form of nationalism is distinctively different from the forms of nationalism that are characterised by xenophobia, chauvinism and authoritarian politics. Miller thinks that historically this former version of nationalism is to be found particularly in modern centralised territorial nation-states of Europe and the US and Australia.

In order to cope with the challenges of globalisation and cultural diversity it is more important than ever that all citizens are bound together by a common national identity and public culture. If the political and cultural coherence of society and the social solidarity of active citizenship are to be maintained and strengthened, it is absolutely necessary that a common collective identity is developed. Miller is aware of the fact that this might be a difficult task, and that many citizens might not share the national culture and identity of the national community. Nevertheless, if active citizenship is to be concerned with creating social responsibility and mutual trust among the citizens in a globalised and multicultural society, this makes a powerful case for maintaining that the boundaries of nations and states should coincide as far as possible (ibid:98). In Miller’s view there is so far no realistic alternative to the national community of compatriots. An active citizenship requires that the citizens are bound together by “thicker” historical and cultural bonds than those offered by universalistic, abstract political principles, such as “human rights” or a cosmopolitan democracy. Miller does have much faith in anchoring citizenship within the frame of the European Union, in that a collective European cultural identity and feeling of belonging is too weak to mobilise an active citizenship, which is necessary to reproduce political coherence and social solidarity. In that respect Miller is thinking within the Westphalian Order of connected and sovereign nation-states, and within the confederate perspective of European integration.

"A shared identity carries with it a shared loyalty, and it increases confidence that others will reciprocate one’s own co-operative behaviour. So far this does not discriminate between various communities that a person may belong to. The importance of national communities here is simply that they are encompassing communities which aspire to draw in everyone who inhabits a particular territory (ibid:92) (…) Trust requires solidarity not merely within groups but across them, and this in turn depends upon a common identification of the kind that nationality alone can provide” (ibid: 140).

Cultural minorities are invited to contribute to the collective considerations concerning what should constitute a common national identity within the nation-state. The democratic citizenship education of the school is considered to be a key component of these considerations.

"The principle of nationality implies that schools should be seen, inter alia, as places where a common national identity is reproduced and children prepared for democratic citizenship. In the case of recently arrived ethnic minorities whose sense of their national identity may be insecure, schools can act as counterweight to the cultural environment of the family. It follows that schools should be public in character, places where members of different groups are thrown together and taught in common” (ibid:142).
In Miller’s view cultural minorities have to assimilate with the national community in order to obtain the status of full citizenship. If groups refuse to assimilate with a common national identity, arguing that this might threaten the internal cultural coherence of the group, two options are at hand. They can withdraw to an existence in internal exiles within the national community, so to speak outside the frame of citizenship. Or they can defend their rights of citizenship, parallel to a defence of their particular cultural identity, and perhaps even claim the right to get access to state resources. If the second option is chosen, Miller states as follows,

"But in the second case they must also recognise the obligations of membership, including the obligation to hand on a national identity to their children so that the latter can grow up to be loyal citizens" (ibid:145).

Miller is advocating “the French model” of active, republican citizenship, which could be outlined in this way:
A liberal model

Yael Tamir, the political philosopher, agrees with Miller in her way of coping with cultural diversity (1995) in regard to the fact that historically constituted bonds of national identities are still important in many peoples lives. Civic nationalism is recommended as a way of coping with cultural diversity within the national communities. Like Miller, she recommends that cross-cultural relations are established and negotiated. But there are fundamental differences in their approach, too. Tamir thinks within a liberal concept of democracy, which Will Kymlicka, her co-liberal thinker, (1995) outlines it in the following way

"The defining feature of liberalism is that it ascribes certain fundamental freedoms to each individual. In particular, it grants people a very wide freedom of choice in terms of how they lead their lives. It allows people to choose a conception of the good life, and then
allows them to reconsider that decision, and adopt a new and hopefully better plan of life” (Kymlicka, 1995:80).

In Tamir’s approach focus is on individual choices as regards the concept of belonging to a community. The second difference compared to Miller is that she incorporates and has greater trust in integrating a post-national European perspective in her thinking. Tamir gives up the idea that the nation-state as a political community should correspond to an integrated cultural community. What she recommends is that the political self-determination of the nation-states is replaced by the EU, which is meant to function as a superior political frame for maintaining and strengthening the cultural autonomy of both individuals and other national and cultural groups. The implication of this is that she thinks that citizenship should be understood as a political concept which in principle could be separated from cultural identities and the feeling of belonging. In Tamir’s view EU should take care of political matters such as military defence, economy etc. This ensures that groups are able to live autonomous lives as cultural entities, and this could especially ensure that the feeling of belonging culturally and their identities are based on the reflexive choices of individuals. In opposition to Miller, Tamir’s version of multiculturalism does not place the commitment of assimilating with a national majority culture in the forefront. Loyalty to the national community is loosened according to a liberal ethos of individualism

"(…) not only should individuals have the right to choose the national group they want to belong to, they should also have the right to define the meanings attached to this membership (…). (ibid:37)

The implications of Tamir’s way of thinking is a double-edged education, composed by two different but related dimensions. One consists of a “thin” layer of “civic education” in which the rationality of liberalism and the legal and formal rights of citizenship are introduced. This dimension of the “good citizenship” is directed towards the European level, as the EU is where the trans-national or cross-cultural political ties are established. The other dimension concerns the “thick” layer of the feeling of belonging culturally and having an identity, what Tamir calls “good nationhood”. The meaning of both dimensions of education is summarised in this way,

”The main goal of educating for citizenship is hence to allow future citizens to participate in political discussions concerning the nature of their society. This, though in a different manner, is also the prime goal of national education, which strives to prepare individuals to participate in the cultural life of their community. National education thus differs from the teaching of a foreign culture since it not only aims to impart knowledge but also to spur the motivation and ability for involvement in the national life of the community. Education is thus crucial to prepare individuals to take part in both realms of discourse – the civic and the national” (ibid:22).

Tamir is aware of the fact that the two dimensions may overlap. But if the challenge is both to cope with cultural diversity, and to recognize the value of national identities, a separation of the formal political state-level and the level of cultural particularism is necessary. Tamir wants to separate what David Miller wants to keep together. The EU and “good citizenship” are connected to the first level, the cultural autonomy of individuals and groups are related to the second level. Tamirs way of thinking can be comprised in the following model,
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A deliberative model

According to Jürgen Habermas, the German political philosopher, the intimate link between citizenship and national identity has to be given up. Thanks to the impact of economic globalisation and expanding cultural diversity within the nation-states, the national community of fate is quickly disintegrating. Democratic politics and citizenship can no
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longer be oriented towards a centralised nation-state or towards a social whole or collective subject such as the nation. Instead he imagines democratic participation and active citizenship within the context of a decentralised society. What could bind a democratic entity together is “the higher level intersubjectivity of communication processes that flow through both the parliamentary bodies and informal networks of the public sphere”. If the political goal of active citizenship and political deliberation is to ensure social solidarity and coherence of society, Habermas considers that time has come to separate active citizenship from cultural identities. Cultural identities can no longer function as mediators of communication processes of citizenship, because “we” are not able to establish collective consensus about these identities in a multicultural society. What is needed is the establishment of de-culturalised political arenas, and the reinforcement of democratic consideration can take place according to abstract and universal principles of processes of communication. In Habermas’ view a culturally embedded communication is a source of political disorientation and potentially irrational.

Bhikhu Parekh, the British-Indian political theorist, (2000) is inspired by Habermas. He also thinks that the vision of active citizenship and democratic consideration centred in the nation-state has to be given up. The Westphalian Order of unity between territory, sovereignty and culture (or identity) is rapidly disintegrating. In this way Parekh thinks within a cosmopolitan perspective of European integration.

But he does not believe that the deliberative way of considering democracy and citizenship can or should be cut loose from the feeling of belonging culturally and identities. Parekh does not believe that it is possible to arrive at a situation where political dialogue or deliberation is conducted according to abstract principles and procedures, in the way for instance Habermas thinks. Political deliberation cannot be culturally “purified”, nor is it the aim of democratic deliberation to overcome cultural diversity. Parakh’s version of deliberative model of democracy, like that of Habermas’, is also dialogically constituted but “[it] stresses the centrality of a dialogue between cultures and the ethical norms, principles and institutional structures presupposed and generated by it” (Parekh, 2000. 14).

All multicultural societies consist of cultural communities, each of them with distinct characters, traditions, customs, memories, and social practises which make it possible to differentiate them from other cultural communities. On the other hand, cultural communities are not isolated islands, and thanks to cultural globalisation all cultural communities are in a process of more or less constant change. Cultural communities are constituted historically, they do not develop according to some co-ordinating authority or logic, they are forming complex and non-systematic wholes.

To belong to a cultural community is a complex matter and characterised by ambiguity. Some individuals agree with all the social practises of the cultural community, others are more selective in their approach, and some do not consider themselves to belong to a specific community at all. In the latter situation individuals and groups may consider themselves to be cultural hybrids or rootless nomads.

"Membership of a cultural community thus varies in kind and degree and is sometimes a subject of deep disagreement. Every community lives with this ambiguity and uncertainty
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(...). Since a culture’s system of beliefs and practices, the locus of its identity is constantly contested, subject to change, and does not form a coherent whole, its identity is never settled, static and free of ambiguity” (ibid:148).

If active citizenship is to be thought within this context of considering cultural diversity, Parekh suggests that the moral status of national identities, which David Miller clings to, is given up, and that eurocentrism should be opposed. Parekh outlines his multicultural democratic education in this way,

"Basically, multicultural education is a critique of the Eurocentric and in that sense monocultural content and ethos of much of the prevailing system of education (Parekh, 2000: 225)

"Ideally, histories and experiences of minority communities should not be taught separately but integrated into the general history of the community. This ensures that their particular experiences and historical memories do not become ghettoised and obsessive and find their proper place in the collective memory and selfunderstanding of the society as a whole (...) It encourages a dialogue between cultures, equip students to converse in multiple cultural idioms, and avoids the cacophonous incomprehension of the Tower of Babel. It challenges the falsehood of Eurocentric history, brings out its complexity and plural narratives, and also fosters social cohesion by enabling students to accept, enjoy and cope with diversity” (ibid: 229-30)

The implication of Parekh’s thinking is that education for active citizenship is that what binds a multicultural society together is primarily of a political nature. Thus, he does not believe in rebuilding a common culture with a well-defined centre or authority, since no culture develops in this way. On the other hand politics is culturally imbedded, and the discussions between cultures are inscribed in power-relations within and between communities. Cultural communities do not only ensure communication and a secure sense of belonging to a community where individuals and groups can act freely and spontaneously. Membership of a community is also the way in which the social lives of individuals and groups are controlled and disciplined. Cultural communities do not develop and flourish independently of political and economical institutions, but shape them, and are shaped by them because

“the politics of culture is integrally tied up with the politics of power because culture is in itself instutionalized power and deeply imbricated with other systems of power (ibid: 343).

So, if Parekh’s points of view should constitute the frame for citizenship education in a multicultural society, according to a advisory model of democracy, it should be practised without privileging a specific community or identity in advance. This does not imply a free choice for all. All societies, local, national, regional or trans-national, are not multicultural in the same way or to the same extent. The cultural diversity of societies has developed under different historical conditions and according to different social and political dynamics, and all societies assert limited moral and political resources from where the challenges of cultural diversity can be met.
So, as a starting point for education for active citizenship as a politics of identity and feeling of belonging, the following decentered deliberative model might be appropriate.

**Active citizenship as a decentered and advisory multicultural model**

![Diagram of active citizenship model with branches for Europe, Nation, Ethnicity, Global, "Race", Diaspora, Immigrant-groups, Religion, Gender, Sexuality, and Class.]
Conclusion

Above I have tried to explore that citizenship is an essentially contested concept. Its meaning and uses are constructed within specific historical, political and socio-cultural contexts. In the late 1980s and during the 1990s the concept of citizenship was revived in the social sciences and in the educational sphere as a normative concept for clarifying what ensures and what challenges the coherence of modern societies? It has become clear that formal, legal rights and duties are not sufficient in that respect. If the concept of active citizenship is on the agenda, the individual and collective identities of community members have to be created and reproduced. However, I have indicated that two inter-connected social processes, expanding processes of globalisation and cultural diversity are questioned: Which communities are, or should be the central loci for citizenship and community membership and the feeling of belonging now and in the future? Towards which communities should active citizenship be directed? Which communities are adequate if the challenges derived from globalisation and cultural diversity are to be met?

So far, there has been a close link between citizenship rights, duties on the one hand, and politics of the feeling of belonging to a nation on the other. Most people have been brought up to think that this link was “natural” and unavoidable. However, globalisation and cultural diversity are questioning whether the previous Westphalian world Order of demarcated and connected nation-states is disintegrating? Communities, institutions and networks below and above the nation-state are in the process of being constructed, does this question the former political and cultural supremacy and hegemony of national communities? Thus, the meaning and consequence of citizenship membership and community loyalty are being re-negotiated and have been the subject for struggle. In what political and cultural spaces is citizenship going to be located? Who are the “strangers” that can constitute the criteria for the practice of inclusion and exclusion?

Tentatively I have sketched out three possible ways of considering education for active citizenship in the future in the perspective of this historical moment. All three of them are open to criticism. But my hope is that they will foster further discussion on how to consider the concept of education for active citizenship on local, national, regional and trans-national and European levels in the future. If people, engaged and working in the educational area, do not seek to influence the contents of this discussion, and seek to influence and decide “the politics of belonging”, the foundations is made for others to take over and make the decisions.
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